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Abstract 
The chapter analyses the adoption and deployment of traditional ‘command-and-control’ 
regulations and ‘new’ environmental policy instruments (NEPIs) as they occur in practice in 
five different jurisdictions, namely Austria, Germany, the Netherlands and United Kingdom 
(UK) as well as the European Union (EU) since the early 1970s. It focuses on three different 
types of NEPIs - informational instruments, voluntary agreements and market-based 
instruments – and examines how and why they have become mixed in different jurisdictions. 
It argues that whilst there has been a significant uptake of NEPIs in all five jurisdictions, 
important differences have remained as regards the composition of instrument mixes in 
particular jurisdictions. Adopting a longitudinal perspective allows for the identification of 
leaders, followers and laggards for different types of NEPIs. Although there may be a 
theoretical ‘optimal mix’ of policy instruments, in reality patterns of adoption and deployment 
are very strongly influenced by a mixture of contingent factors which vary within and across 
jurisdictions, over time. 
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1. Introduction 
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When environmental policy emerged as a distinctive policy field in the early 1970s, traditional 
‘command-and-control’ regulation quickly became the dominant environmental policy 
instrument in most European jurisdictions and in North America (e.g. Faure, Vervaele and Weale 
1994; Bemelmans-Videc, Rist and Vedung 1998; Gunningham and Grabovsky 1998; Wurzel, 
Zito and Jordan 2013). The United Kingdom’s (UK) initial reluctance to adopt statutory 
environmental laws constituted an exception (e.g. Vogel 1986) which, due to domestic reasons 
(e.g. the privatisation of the water industry necessitated the more legalistic approach) and 
external reasons (e.g. the increasing Europeanisation of British environmental policy), largely 
came to an end in the late 1980s (e.g. Jordan 2002; see also Table 4.1 below).  
 
Gunningham and Grabovsky’s (1998: 18) statement that ‘in Europe, there remains heavy 
reliance on command-and-control as the basic instrument and very limited experimentation and 
policy mixes’ still remains broadly correct although, for reasons which will be explained in this 
chapter, it applies more strongly to some European countries than others and is relevant more in 
particular time periods compared to others. In recent years most European countries have 
adopted an increasingly wider range of ‘new’ environmental policy instruments (NEPIs) without 
however abandoning traditional regulatory tools. This has produced often complex mixes of 
‘new’ and ‘old’ instruments that exist side by side or, in some cases, have mutated into hybrid 
instruments (e.g. Gunningham and Grabovsky 1998; Jordan, Wurzel and Zito 2005; Wurzel, Zito 
and Jordan 2013). The need to orchestrate better such complex policy instrument mixes has been 
further exacerbated by the rise of international environmental agreements which have also 
stipulated new instruments or new variants of old instruments (Abbott 2012). As ‘old’ and ‘new’ 
policy instruments have increasingly been combined either by design or default, questions about 
‘smart mixes’ (Gunningham and Grabovsky’s 1998) and ‘not so smart mixes’ (e.g. Howlett and 
Rayner 2004) have become more pertinent. Importantly, the question about instrument mixes 
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‘has become a very central question’ not only for academics but also for practitioners (Interview, 
German Environment Agency official, 2017). 
 
The debate about ‘optimal’ policy instruments and/or instrument mixes was initially dominated 
by economists who usually advocated the use of market-based instruments over traditional 
‘command-and-control’ regulation on efficiency grounds (e.g. Siebert 1976; Baumol and Oates 
1979; Burrows 1979). Economists often either ignored or downplayed the significance of 
contextual factors (such as national regulatory traditions and party political preferences) for 
policy instrument selection although there are important exceptions (e.g. OECD 1994). Legal 
scholars and political scientists, on the other hand, have typically emphasised the importance of 
legal and political context variables (such as their compatibility with particular legal systems and 
the politics of instrument selection) in addition to effectiveness and efficiency criteria. Majone 
(1976) and Hood (1983: 9) put forward some of the first comprehensive policy instrument studies 
from a political science perspective in which they argued that policy instrument choice is an 
inherently political process. As Hood (1983: 136) has argued: ’very commonly it is the 
instrument selected for reaching a policy aim that is far more contentious than the aim itself’. 
Seen from a more political perspective, policy instrument choice is not only about solving 
environmental problems efficiently and effectively but also about who gains and who loses from 
the adoption of which type of policy instrument (e.g. Hood 1983; Lascoumes and Le Gales 2007; 
Wurzel, Zito and Jordan 2013). It is therefore unsurprising that the selection of policy 
instruments and their exact design features, which may vary considerably from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction, often attracts considerable lobbying activities from non-state actors who will be 
affected by these instruments.  
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In order to more precisely assess how different instruments interact to create mixes, it is 
important to assess the characteristics of the instrument types found in the policy sector. 
Consequently, this chapter focuses on the use of traditional ‘command-and-control’ regulation 
and three different types of NEPIs - informational instruments, voluntary agreements and 
market-based instruments – in five different jurisdictions, namely Austria, Germany, the 
Netherlands and United Kingdom (UK) as well as the European Union (EU) since the early 
1970s. As informational instruments are widely perceived as relatively ‘soft’ instruments and 
traditional ‘command-and-control’ regulations as relatively ‘hard’ instruments with voluntary 
agreements and market-based instruments falling somewhere in between, this chapter covers the 
full spectrum which ranges from ‘soft’ to ‘hard’ instruments.  
 
2. Government and governance  
Before assessing in more detail the adoption and usage patterns of ‘new’ and ‘old’ environmental 
policy instruments across jurisdictions and time, we locate the examination about ‘smart’ and 
‘not so smart’ mixes of policy instruments in the wider debate about government and 
governance. Governance and government can be perceived as different forms of governing 
(Finer 1970). If the ‘strong state’ is characterized by the extreme form of top-down government 
in the era of ‘big government’ (e.g. Kitschelt et al. 2003), then the equally extreme form of 
bottom-up governance is represented by self-organising societal systems which are almost 
insusceptible to steering efforts by governments (e.g. Luhmann 1984). These two extreme 
positions can rarely be found in highly developed (European) liberal democracies although they 
constitute useful heuristic analytical devices which can help us to understand better the central 
differences between traditional tools of government (i.e. top-down ‘command-and-control’ 
regulation) and new modes of governance (such as NEPIs and other new modes of governance) 
as well as the policy instrument selection process. In the international relations arena somewhat 
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similar extreme positions have been identified in the form of top-down multilateral agreements 
which stipulate legally binding targets and timetables and bottom-up polycentric governance 
arrangements which rely on voluntary pledges and a high degree of self-coordination. 
 
It is widely accepted that NEPIs can be used as yardsticks to assess empirically whether less 
hierarchical new modes of governance have supplanted or merely supplemented top-down 
‘command-and-control’ regulation (e.g. Bemelmans-Videc, Rist and Vedung 1998; Jordan, 
Wurzel and Zito 2005; Holzinger, Knill and Schäfer 2006; Héritier and Lehmkuhl 2008; Wurzel, 
Zito and Jordan 2013). While much of the general governance literature has claimed that a 
decisive shift from traditional top-down state-led government towards bottom-up societal 
governance has taken place (e.g. Rhodes 1996; Stoker 1998), most of the more empirically 
informed NEPIs studies have argued that ‘new’ policy instruments have either supplemented 
(rather than supplanted) traditional regulation or have formed new hybrid policy instruments 
with features from both ‘old’ and ‘new’ instruments (e.g. Gunningham and Grabosky1998; 
Wurzel, Zito and Jordan 2013).   
 
3. ‘New’ environmental policy instruments 
Much of the policy instrument literature distinguishes between traditional ‘command-and-
control’ regulatory instruments and ‘new’ modes of environmental governance or NEPIs 
(Gunningham and Grabosky 1998; Holzinger and Knill 2003; Jordan, Wurzel and Zito 2005; 
Wurzel, Zito and Jordan 2013). However, the definition of what constitutes a ‘new’ 
environmental policy instrument needs to be established empirically. While certain NEPIs are 
new in some jurisdictions they may have already been in use in other jurisdictions for some time. 
For example, Germany adopted the world’s first eco-label scheme in 1978 while Austria, the 
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Netherlands and the EU adopted somewhat similar schemes only in 1992 (Jordan et al. 2004; 
Wurzel, Zito and Jordan 2013).  
 
There is no universally accepted definition of which instrument types constitute NEPIs although 
the following three-fold typology is relatively widely accepted (e.g.  Bemelmans-Videc, Rist and 
Vedung’s 1997; Bähr 2010; Jordan, Wurzel and Zito 2005; Wurzel, Zito and Jordan 2013): (1) 
informational instruments (which are sometimes also termed suasive instruments), (2) voluntary 
agreements, and (3) market-based instruments. Our relatively parsimonious threefold typology 
has the analytical advantage of making it easier to identify shifting patterns in instrument use 
and thus also policy instrument mixes across jurisdictions and time than would be possible with 
a more complex typology.   
 
3.1. Informational instruments  
Eco-label schemes and environmental management schemes (EMSs) constitute important 
examples of informational policy instruments. They are both relatively ‘soft’ instruments 
which rely on voluntary participation while providing participants with means to publicise 
their relatively good environmental performance (e.g. Wurzel, Zito and Jordan 2013). 
Corporate actors which operate in markets with a high level of public environmental 
awareness and/or ‘green consumerism’ sometimes apply for eco-label schemes or EMSs also 
to avoid a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis competitors which already participate in such 
schemes. The levels of public recognition of eco-label schemes and EMS as well as the 
participation rates are important factors for determining the success or failure of these two 
sub-types of informational instruments. Similar pressures apply to voluntary international 
certification and labelling schemes. 
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3.1.1 Eco-labels 
Informational policy instruments such as eco-label schemes are frequently also labelled 
‘moral suasion’ instruments because they provide citizens and consumers with standardized 
information about the environmental impact of certain products and services with the aim of 
encouraging them to adopt more sustainable purchasing decisions (e.g. Jordan et al. 2004; 
Wurzel, Zito and Jordan 2013). The OECD (1991) differentiates between the following three 
sub-types of eco-label schemes: Type I – externally verified, multi-issue schemes; Type II – 
unverified self-declaratory schemes by manufacturers and/or retailers; and Type III – single 
issue schemes which are based on quantified product information based on life-cycle impacts 
(e.g. the product profile of a particular product model). Type I eco-label schemes, which were 
first designed in Europe (i.e. in Germany) where they have become widely used although 
their popularity varies considerably between different European jurisdictions. Type II 
schemes are widely used by corporate actors across the world although they tend to have a 
poor reputation in terms of their environmental ambition and implementation (Jordan et al. 
2004; OECD 1997). Type III eco-label schemes are usually narrowly focused (e.g. on 
forestry products) and not (yet) very widely used in Europe. For space constraints and 
because they are most widely used in Europe, this chapter focuses only on Type I eco-label 
schemes. 
 
3.1.2 Environmental Management schemes 
Environmental management systems such as the EU’s Environmental Management and Audit 
Scheme (EMAS) and the International Standard Organisation’s (ISO) 14001 standard, provide 
incentives for industry to adopt measures for achieving certain environmental objectives. Both 
EMAS and the ISO 14001 require environmental impact audits, the setting up of internal 
management systems with the aim of reducing the negative environmental impact and the 
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publication of regular public statements. Companies (in the case of EMAS and ISO 14001) and 
public organisations (in the case of EMAS) which achieve the required standards are granted an 
official confirmation and permitted to use a logo for marketing purposes. Although the EU’s 
EMAS and the ISO 14001 are voluntary instruments, public and/or market pressure may push 
companies to participate for fear of losing out to competitors. Several European governments 
(e.g. Austria and Germany) have linked EMAS participation to lighter regulatory regimes (e.g.  
fewer inspections) thus creating additional incentives for this scheme. 
 
3.2 Voluntary Agreements 
There is no universally accepted definition of voluntary agreements. While the EU Commission 
defines voluntary agreements as ‘agreements between industry and public authorities on the 
achievement of environmental objectives’ (CEC 1996: 5) the European Environmental Agency 
(EEA) has adopted a narrower definition which covers ‘only those commitments undertaken by 
firms and sector associations, which are the result of negotiations with public authorities and/or 
explicitly recognised by the authorities’ (EEA 1997: 11).  
 
Börkey and Lévèque’s (1998) have differentiated further voluntary agreements into: (1) 
unilateral commitments, (2) negotiated agreements, and (3) public voluntary schemes. Unilateral 
commitments are self-declaratory improvement measures put forward by corporate actors. 
Negotiated agreements are more formal agreements between industry and public authorities. 
Many negotiated agreements in the Netherlands are ‘covenants’ which are legally binding 
although in practice it can be difficult to enforce them through the courts. In Austria and 
Germany voluntary agreements cannot be legally binding for constitutional reasons. Austria and 
Germany could therefore not have accepted legally binding voluntary agreements which the 
European Commission considered as a possible policy instrument on the EU level in the early 
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2000s (CEC 2002; Wurzel, Zito and Jordan 2013). Negotiated agreements are arguably closer to 
the government end on the government-governance dimension than unilateral commitments 
which are closer to the governance end. This applies in particular to the Dutch covenants which 
Gunningham and Grabosky (1998: 40) have described as ‘innovative version of command and 
control’. Public voluntary schemes, which are not widely used in Europe, are established by 
public bodies. Individual companies are free to join such schemes, although public authorities 
define the membership criteria. This chapter focuses only on negotiated agreements for space 
constraints and because they are the most widely used sub-type voluntary agreements in Europe.  
 
3.3 Market-Based Instruments 
Eco-taxes and emissions trading schemes (ETSs) are widely seen as the most important market-
based policy instruments. The OECD (1994: 17) defines market-based instruments as tools 
which affect ‘estimates of costs of alternative actions open to economic agents’. It distinguishes 
between the following four main types of market-based instruments: (1) eco-taxes (including 
charges and levies); (2) emissions trading; (3) subsidies; and, (4) deposit-refund schemes. In 
Northern Europe eco-taxes have long been widely used. Emissions trading schemes were 
pioneered in the United States of America (USA) on a regional basis (for sulphur dioxide 
emissions) already in the 1980s while European jurisdictions started to experiment with them 
(for carbon dioxide emissions) only in the early 2000s (e.g. Ellerman, Buchner  and Carraro 
2007; Wurzel 2008). However, in 2003 the EU adopted the world’s first 
transnational/supranational ETS which became operational in 2005.  
 
Subsidies (e.g. for renewable energy) and fiscal incentives (e.g. for less polluting cars) are 
relatively widely used in Europe. Although there are important exceptions (e.g. OECD 1999), 
most neoliberal economists have been critical of subsidies and fiscal incentive for less 
10 
 
environmentally damaging activities because they consider them to constitute market-distorting 
instruments. Subsidies for environmentally damaging activities (e.g. energy production in 
subsidised coal-fired power stations) have long been criticized by economists and environmental 
groups as well as environment agency officials (Interviews, 2017) although governments have 
found it difficult to abolish them. The empirical focus of this chapter will be on eco-taxes and 
emissions trading schemes which are widely seen as the most important market-based 
environmental instruments in Europe. 
 
4. Adoption Patterns of NEPIs and Regulation in Different Jurisdictions Over Time 
Before assessing in more detail the adoption and usage patterns of particular types of ‘new’ and 
‘old’ policy instruments, we first analyse the general overall instrument adoption patterns across 
jurisdictions and over time. This will allow for both the identification of leaders, followers and 
laggards for particular policy instruments and the detection of jurisdictional policy instrument 
mixes and how they have changed over time. As explained in Chapter 1 by can Erp et al., policy 
mixes are rarely designed as a totality; instead a more gradual layering process occurs as policy-
makers experiment with new ideas and instruments in their particular jurisdictional context.  
 
Table 4.1 summarizes the adoption rates of the above mentioned three types of NEPIs and 
environmental regulation across five European jurisdictions between the 1970s and 2010s. Table 
4.1 uses simple weighting categories – low, medium and high - to allow for meaningful 
comparisons between four different instrument types across five jurisdictions over a period of 
almost 50 years. The data in Table 4.1s is largely based on a study by Wurzel, Zito and Jordan 
(2013) ,who assessed a wide range of primary documents and undertook more than 50 interviews 
in all four member states as well as on the EU level between 2002-2012. It has been updated 
with additional primary research (including interviews) in 2017. Importantly, the descriptors 
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used in Table 4.1 offer a relative comparison across jurisdictions and time, rather than an absolute 
baseline judgement. 
 
Table 4.1:  The use of different NEPIs and environmental regulations since the 1970s  
 Jurisdiction 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 2010s 
Instrument 
type 
Eco-label 
scheme 
 
Austria 
(*1990) 
--- --- Medium 
 
Medium 
 
Medium 
Germany 
(*1978) 
Medium  High High 
 
High/ 
medium 
 
Medium 
Netherlands 
(*1992) 
-- --- Low 
 
Low 
 
Low 
UK  --- --- --- --- --- 
EU eco-
label  
(*1992) 
--- --- Low Low Low 
EU EMAS 
(*1993) 
Austria --- --- High High/ 
Medium 
High/ 
medium 
Germany --- --- High High/ 
medium 
High/ 
medium 
Netherlands --- --- Low Low Low 
UK  --- --- Low Low Low 
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EU 
average  
--- --- Low Low Low 
Voluntary 
Agree-
ments 
Austria Low Low Medium/ 
high 
Medium/ 
Low 
Low 
Germany Low High High Medium/ 
Low 
Low 
Netherlands Low High High Medium Low/ 
medium 
UK Low Low/ 
medium 
Low/ 
medium 
Low Low 
EU-wide 
use 
--- --- Low Low Low 
Eco-taxes Austria Low Medium Medium Low Low 
Germany Low Medium High Medium  Low 
Netherlands Medium High High Medium Low 
UK Low Low Medium Medium Low 
EU-wide 
use 
--- --- --- --- --- 
ETS 
 
Austrian 
ETS 
--- --- --- Low. EU 
ETS in 2005 
EU ETS 
German 
ETS  
--- --- --- Low. EU 
ETS in 2005 
EU ETS 
Dutch ETS --- --- Low Medium 
national 
experiments. 
EU ETS 
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EU ETS in 
2005 
UK ETS 
(*2002) 
--- --- --- High/ 
Medium. 
National 
ETS 
replaced by 
EU ETS in 
2005 
EU ETS 
EU ETS 
(*2005) 
--- --- --- High/ 
medium 
High/ 
medium 
Environ-
mental 
regulation 
Austria Low Medium High Medium Medium 
Germany High High High High Medium 
Netherlands High High High/ 
medium 
Medium Medium 
UK Low Medium Medium Medium Low 
EU High High High Medium Medium/ 
low 
Note: (*) Refers to the year in which a particular instrument was adopted first. 
Source: Adapted from Wurzel, Zito and Jordan (2013: 213-214) with updates based on 
interviews carried out in 2017. 
 
The following broad four conclusions can be drawn from Table 4.1. First, the use of NEPIs has 
overall become more widespread since the 1970s. All five jurisdictions have adopted some 
NEPIs. This finding is in line with the existing policy instrument literature which has argued that 
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there has been a significant rise in the adoption of NEPIs across a wide range of jurisdictions 
(e.g. Bemelmans-Videc, Rist and Vedung 1997; De Bruijn and Hufen 1998; Holzinger and Knill 
2003; Bähr 2010; Jordan, Wurzel and Zito 2005; Wurzel, Zito and Jordan 2013). Gunningham 
and Grabosky’s (1998: 89) statement that ‘environmental policy is in transition: from command 
and control towards a much more pluralistic conception of instrument design’ therefore still 
seems largely applicable although there has been a decline in the use of certain NEPIs. For 
example, voluntary agreements have been less popular in the 2000/10s then they were in the 
1980s/90s.  
 
Second, although there has been an overall increase in the use of NEPIs it has taken place at 
various speeds across different jurisdictions. Considerable fluctuations have occurred in the 
adoption patterns of particular NEPIs (as well as traditional regulations) across different 
jurisdictions (see also Wurzel, Zito and Jordan 2013). For example, as will be explained in more 
detail below, the Netherlands and Germany have adopted a much larger number of voluntary 
agreements than Austria, the EU and UK. While the UK has remained the only jurisdiction which 
has failed to adopt its own eco-label scheme it acted as an emissions trading leader when it set 
up a national pilot scheme before the EU ETS became operational in 2005. 
 
Third, although NEPIs are now overall more widely used in all five jurisdictions compared to 
the early 1970s, they can be more commonly found in some jurisdictions (e.g. the Netherlands 
and Germany) than in others (e.g. the EU). Some jurisdictions have been early adopters of 
particular types of NEPIs but ambivalent about or even hostile towards other types of NEPIs. 
For example, Germany adopted its eco-label scheme in 1978 while Austria and the Netherlands 
as well as the EU adopted their own eco-label schemes only in 1992. Austria and Germany did 
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not have in place emissions trading schemes with which the Netherlands and in particular the 
UK experimented much earlier on (Wurzel, Zito and Jordan 2013).  
 
Fourth, the adoption patterns of NEPIs (and traditional regulation) can vary not only across 
jurisdictions but also across time. For example, the Netherlands and Germany both adopted more 
voluntary agreements in the 1980s/90s than in the 2000s/10s. The adoption of the EU ETS 
constitutes one important factor for the decline in Dutch and German voluntary agreements 
which were particularly widely used for climate change issues. In these cases one type of NEPI 
(i.e. emissions trading) seems to have at least partly supplanted another type of NEPI (i.e. 
voluntary agreements). This empirical finding is in line with Hood’s (1983: 126) argument that 
a ‘re-tooling’ process may take place from time to time.  
 
Salomon (2002: 18) has pointed out that ‘[f]ar from simplifying the task of public policy solving, 
the proliferation of tools has importantly complicated it even while enlarging the range of options 
and the pool of resources potentially brought to bear’. Questions have therefore been raised about 
what constitutes an ‘optimal’ or ‘smart’ mix of environmental policy instrument (e.g. 
Gunningham and Grabosky 1998; Jordan, Wurzel and Zito 2007).  
 
As will be explained in more detail below, what complicates any cross-jurisdictional 
comparisons, is the fact that the same type of NEPI may be used in dissimilar ways in different 
jurisdictions (e.g. Jordan, Wurzel and Zito 2005; Wurzel, Zito and Jordan 2013). When 
comparing the use of particular policy instruments and/or instrument mixes is therefore 
important to take into account how exactly a certain NEPI is used in a particular jurisdiction.  
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The chronological breakdown of NEPIs usage in Table 4.1 above enables us to identify patterns 
of policy instrument sequencing. Much of the existing policy instrument literature advocates a 
sequencing which starts with softer (i.e. less coercive) instruments before the adoption of harder 
(i.e. more coercive) instruments (e.g. Gunningham and Grabosky 1998; Salamon 2002; Vedung 
1997). While drawing on Doern and Wilson (1974), Vedung (1997: 40) has argued that  
‘the least coercive instruments are introduced first in order to gradually weaken the 
resistance of certain groups of individuals and adjust them to government intervention in 
the area. After some time, the authorities feel entitled to regulate the matters definitely 
by employing their most powerful instrument’.  
Similarly, Gunningham and Grabosky (1998: 123) have argued for the sequencing of 
environmental policy instruments: it enables ‘escalation from the preferred least interventionist 
option, if it fails, to increasingly more interventionist alternatives’. 
 
The gradual ratcheting upwards of policy instruments according to their degree of coerciveness 
- starting with soft policy instruments (i.e. horizontal self-governance) and ending with hard 
policy instruments (i.e. coercive top-down government) - is principally also in line with 
liberal/neoliberal economic thinking. However, the empirical evidence put forward in this 
chapter shows a different pattern (see also Wurzel, Zito and Jordan 2013). Germany, the 
Netherlands and EU all relied almost exclusively on traditional environmental regulations in the 
1970s. Austrian and in particular UK environmental policy initially relied less heavily 
environmental regulations. However, by the 1980s, environmental regulations were also the 
dominant policy instrument in Austria. In 1970s and 1980s, EU environmental policy relied 
almost exclusively on traditional environmental regulation (in the form of directives, regulations 
and decisions). Importantly, in four out of five jurisdictions traditional environmental regulations 
were adopted first before they were supplemented by softer environmental policy instruments. 
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Germany’s early and heavy reliance on traditional environmental regulation instead of NEPIs 
can be explained with reference to its dominant policy style and its state of law (Rechtsstaat) 
tradition as well as the fact that voluntary agreements or other soft policy instruments were 
‘deemed inappropriate for the defence against dangers (Gefahrenabwehr) to the environment 
and human health. You need regulations for such a task’ (Interview, German Environment 
Ministry official, 2001). The UK was initially reluctant to adopt statutory environmental 
standards. However, this gradually changed when it had to implement a rapidly increasing 
number of EU environmental regulations from the mid-1970s onwards. Around that time EU 
environmental legislation therefore became a major driver for UK environmental policy. Clearly, 
particular policy instruments are considered more appropriate and legitimate in certain 
jurisdictions regardless of their theoretical advantages, for example, in terms of efficiency (e.g. 
Howlett 1991; Salamon 2002: 24).  
 
4.1 Usage Patterns of Informational Instruments 
4.1.1 Eco-labels 
Germany adopted the world’s first national eco-label scheme in 1978. Austria (1991) and the 
Netherlands (1992) followed with their own national eco-label schemes. In 1992 the EU adopted 
an EU-wide eco-label scheme which supplements (rather than supplants) member states’ 
national eco-label schemes. The UK (is one of several EU member states which) has relied solely 
on the EU eco-label. However, the EU eco-label scheme continues to suffer from relatively low 
participation rates which are at least partly due to low recognition rates among the general public 
who tend to know more about their national eco-label scheme where such a scheme exists. 
However, the popularity of national eco-label schemes has also undergone certain ups and downs 
over time. Table 4.1 illustrates that the German Blue Angel eco-label scheme was significantly 
more popular in the 1980s/90s than in the 2010s.  
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During the early 1990s, a rapid global diffusion of eco-labels took place although not all eco-
label schemes became successful (Jordan et al. 2004). The Dutch and, although to a lesser degree, 
the Austrian eco-label schemes still suffer from relatively low take up while some countries (e.g. 
the UK) decided against the adoption of national eco-label schemes. The German Blue Angel 
scheme acted as a catalyst, but eco-label scheme followers did not simply copy it. For example, 
the Austrian, Dutch and EU eco-label schemes have put more emphasis on sophisticated life-
cycle analysis while the German eco-label scheme has relied more strongly on simplicity with 
the aim of communicating clear messages to consumers and participants. Importantly, the 
various national eco-label schemes reflect national preferences: the German scheme puts a lot of 
emphasis on products (and services), Austria pioneered a tourism eco-label and the Dutch were 
first to include the food and flower sectors.  
 
4.1.2 Environmental Management Schemes 
In 1993 the EU adopted EMAS which became applicable in 1995. The EU negotiated EMAS at 
about the same time as the ISO discussed the 14001 standard which created a similar, although 
less demanding, voluntary EMS which has worldwide recognition. The UK, which had already 
in place national standards for domestic EMSs, initially supported both the EU’s EMAS and the 
ISO 14001. However, while the ISO 14001, which closely resembled the British national EMS 
standards, has achieved a relatively high adoption rate in the UK, the EU’s EMAS has not done 
so partly because its requirements significantly exceeded the British Standard Institution’s/ISO’s 
standards. Austria and Germany were initially highly sceptical about EMAS for the following 
two main reasons. First, EMAS constitutes a procedural policy instrument which initially did not 
fit easily with the dominant Austrian and German environmental regulatory styles that are both 
characterised by a high number of substantive policy measures which are derived from the best 
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available technology (BAT) (Stand der Technik) principle. Second, Austrian and German 
environmental policy makers were initially weary that self-regulatory environmental 
management systems (in the form of EMAS and ISO 14001) might weaken substantive 
environmental standards. However, by the 2000s, about 70% of all registered EMAS sites were 
in Austria and Germany. One reasons for the surprising popularity of EMAS in Germany is due 
to the fact that the German government has combined EMAS with traditional regulatory 
instruments (e.g. by reducing the environmental regulatory burden in the form of fewer 
inspections for companies which successfully participate in EMAS).   
 
4.2 Usage Patterns of Voluntary Agreements 
The adoption of voluntary agreements has overall grown significantly since the 1970s despite 
concerns about their effectiveness (OECD 2003). As was pointed out already above, the most 
popular type of voluntary agreement within the EU is the negotiated agreement. However, even 
for this particular sub-type of voluntary agreements significant jurisdictional differences exist in 
terms of their specific design and usage. Since the 1990s, most Dutch voluntary agreements have 
taken the form of legally binding covenants (e.g. Mol, Lauber and Liefferink 2000). The Dutch 
covenants, which are negotiated between industry and government within a fairly formalised 
process, stipulate monitoring requirements and are at least in theory enforceable through the 
courts. All German voluntary agreements are non-binding, although they are often negotiated in 
the ‘shadow of the law’ and thus often proposed by industry as a means of pre-empting regulation 
(Wurzel, Zito and Jordan 2013). Compared to the Dutch covenants Austrian and German 
voluntary agreements are developed in a much more informal manner and sometimes even fail 
to stipulate explicit monitoring requirements although notable exceptions exist. In the UK 
relatively few (negotiated) voluntary agreements exist most of which are non-binding and very 
flexible.  
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The uptake of voluntary agreements at EU level has also remained very low. By the early 2000s, 
only 12 EU-wide environmental voluntary agreements have been adopted despite considerable 
efforts by the EU Commission’s to increase their uptake (CEC 2002). EU-wide voluntary 
agreements are normally negotiated between the Commission and companies. Once agreement 
has been reached between these two actors they are communicated to the Council and European 
Parliament (EP) the latter of which has traditionally been hostile towards the adoption of EU-
wide voluntary agreements for legitimacy and transparency reasons which helps to explain  their 
low uptake. EU-wide voluntary agreements have to be adopted outside the formal decision-
making procedures as they are not listed in the EU Treaties as possible policy instruments for 
the EU. The EP therefore lacks a clearly defined role in the adoption process of EU-wide 
voluntary agreements which weakens the legitimacy of this type of policy instrument on the EU 
level. Moreover, as voluntary agreements cannot be enforced under the EU Treaties, there are 
serious concerns about free-riding which is also a potential weakness of member state voluntary 
agreements. However, these concerns are magnified on the EU level because a much larger 
number of actors are usually involved thus making monitoring more challenging while in terms 
of competition more is at stake in the much larger Single European Market (SEM) than member 
states’ national markets.  
 
4.3 Usage Patterns of Market-based Instruments  
4.3.1 Eco-taxes 
Japan and Germany adopted some of the world’s first eco-taxes in the early 1970s (Andersen 
1996; Andersen and Sprenger 2000). However, although Germany adopted a wastewater levy 
already in 1974 it was actually not fully implemented until the early 1980s (e.g. Wurzel, Zito 
and Jordan 2013). A more systematic use of eco-taxes occurred in Europe first in the Netherlands 
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and the Nordic countries in the 1980s and 1990s (Andersen 1996; Andersen and Sprenger 2000: 
27). The UK adopted major national eco-taxes only from the 1990s onwards (OECD 1993).  
 
There is wide variation in the type of eco-taxes adopted in the five jurisdictions assessed in this 
chapter. Between the early 1990s and early 2000s, the Netherlands adopted the most 
comprehensive range of eco-taxes. Germany introduced a major ecological tax reform in 1998 
and a raft of additional eco-taxes in 2010. In other words, Germany developed further this 
particular policy instrument in the late 1990s. Austria and the UK have adopted more modest 
eco-taxes in a narrower range of sectors.  
 
The Dutch eco-taxes evolved from environmental charges and levies which were used to support 
specific regulatory efforts to more encompassing general eco-taxes, German eco-taxes evolved 
more gradually and very much in an ad hoc fashion until the adoption of the ecological tax reform 
in 1998. Austria set up a Tax Reform Commission which reported on a possible ecological tax 
reform which, however, was not adopted. Instead the Austrian government continued to fine tune 
existing eco-taxes while incrementally adding new ones. The UK has innovated with 
hypothecated eco-taxes and a wide range of eco-taxes in the 1990s but has since fallen behind 
again. Germany, the Netherlands and UK innovated with eco-taxes that were explicitly linked to 
a reduction in labour costs (e.g. in the form of reduced national insurance and/or pension 
contributions). Although they tend to emit a large number of greenhouse gas emissions, high 
energy users which are in direct competition with companies abroad have been granted generous 
exemptions from eco-taxes in Austria, Germany, the Netherlands and UK. The EU has so far 
failed to adopt EU-wide eco-taxes despite the European Commission’ strong push for an EU-
wide carbon dioxide/energy tax in the early 1990s. The main reason for this is the unanimity 
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requirement for the adoption of all taxes on the supranational EU level against which the UK has 
been opposed on sovereignty grounds.  
 
4.3.2 Emissions trading 
At the insistence of the USA, the 1997 Kyoto Protocol stipulated emissions trading (and other 
flexible instruments such as Joint Implementation (JI) and the Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM) as a possible policy instrument for achieving the greenhouse gas reductions. The EU and 
most of its member states were initially strongly opposed to emissions trading although they 
eventually gave in to American pressure (Grubb, Vrolijk and Brack 1999; Wurzel 2008). Only 
the UK (and Denmark) as well as, although to a much lesser degree, the Netherlands 
experimented with national emissions schemes prior to the setting up of the EU ETS.  
 
The EU ETS, which distinguished a first trading phase (2005-07) and second trading phase 
(2008-12), was initially a highly decentralised ETS for CO2 emissions from stationary sources. 
A third trading phase (2013-2020) was added during the revision of the EU ETS which 
centralised the rules of the scheme. The Commission acted as an emissions trading policy 
instrument entrepreneur. Frustrated by the lack of progress of its carbon dioxide/energy tax 
proposal, which had been vetoed by the UK, and concerned about competing national ETSs, the 
Commission proposed an EU-wide emissions trading in a Green Paper in 2000. It was strongly 
supported in its efforts by the majority of member states (including the UK and the Netherlands) 
and the EP. The German government remained opposed to emissions trading until well into the 
adoption phase of the EU ETS. Only after the 2002 national elections in which the Greens gained 
a significant number of seats in parliament the German government started to support the 
adoption of the EU ETS.     
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Austria and Germany initially acted as emissions trading laggards. The German Chancellor 
Gerhard Schröder almost torpedoed the adoption of the EU ETS. However, Austria and 
Germany (as well as the Netherlands and UK) have since supported the tightening and 
centralisation of the rules of the EU ETS.  In the second and third trading phases Germany 
has made wide use of auctioning while Austria recognised that the EU ETS had become an 
essential policy instrument for achieving its Kyoto Protocol greenhouse gases reduction 
target.    
 
4.4 Environmental Regulations 
Gunningham and Grabosky (1998: 38) have argued that ‘[t]he dominant government response 
[to the arrival of environmental issues on the political agenda], … has been the application of 
“direct” or “command and control” regulation designed to prohibit or restrict environmentally 
harmful activities’. Regulation remains important even in jurisdictions where NEPI use is high, 
such as in the Netherlands and Germany. In short, there has not been a wholesale switch to 
NEPIs. Instead NEPIs seem to have supplemented rather than supplanted regulatory tools (see 
also Mol, Lauber and Liefferink 2000; Holzinger and Knill 2003; Wurzel, Zito and Jordan 2013; 
Interviews, Member State official, 2017). NEPIs often ‘fill in the cracks’ not covered by 
regulation or deal with emerging issues like climate change which are difficult to tackle with 
regulations. Moreover, many NEPIs also require regulations, for example, to set the rules for 
their operation. Gunningham and Grabosky (1998) have therefore argued that hybrid instruments 
which are made up of both NEPIs and regulations have emerged.  
 
Importantly, regulation remains the mainstay of EU environmental policy despite the fact that a 
reduction in their adoption rate has taken place in the 2010s. The EU has adopted a relatively 
large number of traditional environmental regulations (in the form of directive, regulations and 
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decisions). However, it has struggled greatly to develop a popular eco-label scheme, been very 
slow in adopting voluntary agreements, and has failed to clear the unanimity requirement (among 
member states) for EU-wide eco-taxes. A strong EU entrepreneurial NEPIs influence is 
discernible only with respect to emissions trading.  Relatively few EU level NEPIs exist despite 
political commitments to adopt more of them (see the Commission’s 2001 White Paper on 
European Governance (CEC 2001). One important reason for this is that member states tend to 
support the adoption of common policy objectives at the EU and/or international level but are 
keen to reserve the right to determine the instruments of achieving them.  
 
Environmental regulation has taken on an important supporting role for the adoption of many 
NEPIs. This is the case in particular for market-based policy instruments such as emissions 
trading and eco-taxes. Gunningham and Grabosky (1998: 391) have pointed out that ‘[s]ome 
economic instruments, such as taxes and charges, are high on coercion and low on prescription’. 
It was arguably only due to the ‘shadow of the law’ (Héritier and Lehmkul 2008) that a large 
number of voluntary agreements were adopted in Germany and, although to somewhat lesser 
degree, in Austria in the 1990s. The Dutch convenants constitute quasi-legal agreements. Many 
NEPIs therefore rely on regulation.  
 
A cross-jurisdictional trend towards greater flexibility in environmental regulations is 
discernible across all five jurisdictions where traditional environmental regulations have become 
less rigid and more flexible. Since the early 1990s, EU and member state environmental 
regulations have become more flexible and innovative. In other words, European environmental 
regulations have become ‘smarter’ (Gunningham and Grabovsky 1998). While remaining 
dominant in most jurisdictions regulation has evolved over time.  It is often adopted in ‘smarter’ 
or more ‘light handed’ forms when compared to the early ‘command-and-control’ regulations 
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which featured large in the 1970s (Gunningham and Grabosky 1998; Rengeling and Hof 2001). 
For example, in the UK, the national integrated pollution control regime (i.e. regulation) shares 
many similarities with what continental states describe as negotiated agreements underpinned by 
the law (e.g. the Dutch covenants). 
 
Gunningham and Grabosky’s (1998) use ‘smart regulation’ as an umbrella term which subsumes 
a wide range of NEPIs including eco-labels, environmental management systems, voluntary 
agreements, eco-taxes and ETSs. In this chapter, we distinguished conceptually between 
environmental regulations and NEPIs although we also paid attention to the hybridisation of 
‘old’ instruments (i.e. regulations) and ‘new’ tools (i.e. NEPIs). This has helped us to identify 
the changing patterns of the use of traditional regulation and NEPIs in four member states 
(Austria, Germany, the Netherlands and UK) and on the EU level as well as the changing policy 
instrument mixes which they have produced. 
 
5. Leaders, Followers and Laggards 
Table 4.2 summarises the adoption patterns for NEPIs in the five European jurisdictions assessed 
in this chapter. Importantly the analytical descriptors - leader, follower and laggard - used in 
Table 4.2 (like in Table 4.1 above) offer a relative assessment between the five jurisdictions 
listed, rather than an absolute ranking. NEPI leaders as defined in Table 4.2 are jurisdictions 
which have first made significant use of a particular NEPI type. Followers eventually catch up 
with the leaders while laggards either fail to adopt a particular type of NEPI or utilise it only in 
an insignificant manner.  
 
Table 4.2: Leaders, followers and laggards  
Types of NEPIs Leader Follower Laggard 
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Informational 
instruments 
Eco-label  Germany Austria, EU 
Netherlands 
UK 
EMS/EMAS UK, EU Germany, 
Austria  
Netherlands 
Voluntary 
instruments 
Voluntary 
Agreements 
Germany, 
Netherlands 
Austria, UK EU 
Market-based 
instruments 
Eco-taxes Netherlands, 
Germany 
Austria, UK EU 
Emissions 
trading  
UK, EU, 
Netherlands 
Austria, 
Germany 
--- 
Source: Adapted from Wurzel, Zito and Jordan (2013) with updates. 
 
Leaders may eventually be overtaken by followers in the use of a particular NEPI. In order to 
achieve a better domestic fit and/or to improve its effectiveness, followers often modify NEPIs 
which they have transferred voluntarily from another jurisdiction or which has been ‘coercively’ 
transferred to their jurisdiction. Germany acted as an early leader for eco-label schemes when it 
set up its domestic Blue Angel scheme in 1978. However, it was primarily the general idea 
behind this NEPI type which was transferred to other jurisdictions (including the EU) rather than 
the specific rules of the original German eco-label scheme. Austria (1990), the Netherlands 
(1992) and EU (1992) all followed the German example only after a considerable time lag but 
without simply copying the German Blue Angel scheme. The followers all adopted domestic 
eco-label schemes which exhibited some novel features that reflected both domestic priorities 
and the desire to achieve a good domestic fit and increased effectiveness.  
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The UK set the pace for EMSs with its innovative BS 7750 voluntary standard which also 
influenced the EU’s EMAS. Germany and Austria initially opposed the EU’s proposal for 
EMAS. However, once the EU had adopted EMAS, the followers Germany and Austria quickly 
became the highest EMAS users leaving well behind the UK in EMAS registrations. Germany 
and Austria lobbied hard both to make EMAS more ambitious and to extend its scope from 
private companies to public institutions such as government ministries and agencies. The 
Netherlands never developed a national EMS and has made only little use of EMAS. Dutch firms 
have instead preferred the ISO 14001 standard which is environmentally less ambitious but has 
a global reach.  
 
The Netherlands and Germany have been early innovators and heavy users of voluntary 
agreements. However, the core features of Dutch and German voluntary agreements differ 
significantly (e.g. Wurzel, Zito and Jordan, 2013). The Netherlands makes wide use of sector-
wide covenants which are legally binding and monitored by independent institutions. German 
voluntary agreements are non-binding agreements (Selbstverpflichtungen i.e. self-binding 
agreements) usually put forward by companies with the aim of pre-empting government 
regulation. Only a small number of German voluntary agreements has been monitored by an 
independent verifier. Austria became a voluntary agreements follower in the 1980s when it partly 
emulated the non-binding German voluntary agreements (rather than the Dutch covenants). 
However, after extensive usage in the 1990s there was a steep decline in voluntary environmental 
agreements usage in Austrian in the 2000s. Constitutional reasons have prevented Austria and 
Germany from adopting legally binding voluntary agreements such as the Dutch convenants. 
The UK has adopted only a moderate number of voluntary agreements. The lack of a clear Treaty 
base for voluntary agreements prevented EU Commission officials from trying to emulate the 
Dutch covenants (Interviews, 2001 and 2004). Moreover, concerns about free riders are 
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magnified at the EU level due to the significantly large number of actors involved and the large 
size of the SEM which makes more important arguments about fair competition.   
 
Importantly, although the early leaders (Germany and the Netherlands) have remained the largest 
users of voluntary agreements within the EU, their popularity declined even in the two innovator 
states in the 2000s and even more so in the 2010s (see Table 4.2). One important explanation for 
the declining popularity in the use of voluntary agreements is that they have been supplanted by 
other NEPIs and/or traditional environmental regulations. For example, the EU ETS rendered 
obsolete some Dutch, German and Austrian voluntary agreements aimed at reducing greenhouse 
gas emissions while legislation has overwritten the EU-wide voluntary agreement on the 
reduction of CO2 emissions by the car industry. 
 
The Netherlands was an early eco-taxes innovator which has consistently made use of a wide 
range of eco-taxes. Germany was also an early eco-taxes pioneer when it adopted the 1976 waste 
water levy (Andersen 1994). However, although Germany strongly supported the adoption of an 
EU-wide carbon dioxide/energy tax, its domestic use of eco-taxes remained moderate until the 
adoption of an ecological tax reform in 1998. Austria and the UK were followers which made 
use of eco-taxes only belatedly when compared to the Netherlands and Germany. However, the 
UK adopted some innovative eco-taxes (e.g. the fuel escalator) which influenced the eco-tax 
thinking of environmental policy makers in Austria, Germany and the Netherlands. The EU is 
an eco-taxes laggard because it failed to adopt a supranational eco-tax. One important reason for 
this is because the UK has consistently vetoed taxes on the EU level on sovereignty grounds. 
Whether the UK’s exit from the UK may pave the way for the adoption of EU-wide eco-taxes 
remains however doubtful. Member states other than the UK (e.g. traditionally Spain and more 
recently the Visegrad countries) have traditionally also been opposed to EU-wide eco-taxes for 
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fear that this may put them at an economic disadvantage. Because the EU failed to adopt a 
supranational carbon dioxide/energy taxes, a group of like-minded European countries met 
between 1994 and 1998 to discuss the practical experience with and possible transnational 
coordination of national eco-taxes although little progress was made. 
 
The UK became an emissions trading innovator when it set up Europe’s first domestic ETS for 
greenhouse gases in 2002. Up to the early 2000s, the Netherlands experimented only with 
rudimentary small-scale domestic ETSs (e.g. for manure). In 2003 the EU adopted the world’s 
first supranational ETS for CO2 emissions. Austria and Germany which initially acted as 
reluctant ETS followers eventually became supportive of a relatively ambitious EU ETS. 
 
Importantly, emissions trading constitutes the only NEPI type assessed in this chapter for which 
the EU has acted as a genuine innovator. However, the EU was only a reluctant emissions trading 
pioneer (Wurzel 2008). It is unlikely that the EU ETS and UK ETS ‘could have been adopted as 
quickly as they were without America setting a domestic example and insisting on emissions 
trading in the 1997 Kyoto Protocol’(Wurzel 2008: 5).  
 
Germany (eco-labels, voluntary agreements and, although to a lesser degree, eco-taxes) and 
the Netherlands (voluntary agreements, eco-taxes and, although to a lesser degree, emissions 
trading) have both acted as leaders for three types of NEPIs albeit different ones. The UK 
(EMS and emissions trading) for two types of NEPIs and the EU (emissions trading) were 
leaders for only one NEPI type. Austria is the only jurisdiction which failed to become a 
leader for any of the five NEPIs assessed in this chapter. Nevertheless, Austria always 
followed the NEPIs leader thus avoiding the status of NEPIs laggard. Similarly, Germany 
always acted as a follower in cases where it was not a NEPIs innovator. The UK (eco-labels) 
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and EU (voluntary agreements and eco-taxes) acted as laggards for one and two NEPI types 
respectively. The EU had adopted only about a dozen EU-wide voluntary agreements by the 
2010s; this amounts to an insignificant use of voluntary agreements when compared to the 
large number of voluntary agreements adopted by especially the Netherlands and Germany. 
The Netherlands could be classified as an EMS laggard because it made only insignificant 
use of EMAS and failed to adopt a domestic EMS. However, Dutch firms have made 
relatively wide use of the ISO 14001. 
The analytical classification of leader, follower and laggard can mask significant changes in 
the use of particular NEPIs that may take place in a certain jurisdiction over time. Table 4.2 
illustrates the changing usage patterns for the different types of NEPIs in each of the five 
jurisdictions. It shows that once a certain type of NEPI has been adopted by a particular 
jurisdiction its usage tends to change only gradually. The usage of voluntary agreements 
seems to have peaked in the Netherlands, Germany and Austria in the 1990s. Similarly the 
drive for eco-taxes lost momentum in the 2000s. The EU ETS, which became operational in 
2005, is the only NEPI whose usage expanded significantly in the 2000s (and early 2010s). 
These findings provide empirical evidence for the claim that ‘re-tooling’ processes take place 
over time (Hood 1983: 126).  
 
This contribution has assessed the role of the EU in terms of the ability to innovate  ‘old’ and 
‘new’ policy instruments.  However, there is a broader question about what impact the 
supranational EU has had on the member state policy instrument mixes.  Because the EU has 
often been the NEPIs laggard its role in transforming the policy mix of the member states has 
largely focused on climate change and particularly the ETS, which involved all member 
states having to reshape their climate governance approach to some extent. With the 
exception of the ETS, the EU has not added particularly to the member states policy 
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instrument mixes with the important exception of traditional regulation. This is not to 
downplay the EU role as, from the 1970s, the EU has issued a relatively large number of 
supranational environmental laws creating common standards and objectives that its member 
states have had to follow. Over time, those regulations have generated their own innovations. 
Accordingly the Water Framework Directive was notable for creating certain processes 
which enhanced dialogue with society (Page and Kaika 2003). This harkens back to the 
notion of ‘smart regulation’, where the instrument contains several different mechanisms 
(Gunningham et al. 1989). By contrast the regulatory framework that protects the operation 
of the SEM means that that the EU, in the form of state aid and competition policy concerns, 
has had a prohibitive or at least limiting impact on member states seeking to expand their 
mixes with, for example, subsidies and other incentives. For example, the German ecological 
tax reform could be adopted by the German parliament only after it had been altered to 
comply with instructions from the European Commission (Wurzel, Zito and Jordan 2013).  . 
 
 
CONCLUSION  
The chapter assessed how policy instrument mixes appear in the real world as opposed to the 
theoretical world of (especially economic) textbooks.  It has shown how the mixes have 
changed over a period of almost five decades by focusing on traditional regulation and three 
different types of NEPIs - informational instruments, voluntary agreements and market-based 
instruments (eco-taxes and emissions trading) in five jurisdictions, namely Austria, Germany, 
the Netherlands and UK as well as the EU. The empirical focus on NEPIs and traditional 
regulation allowed us to analyse whether new modes of governance have supplanted or merely 
supplemented traditional methods of government (i.e. command-and-control regulation) in 
different European jurisdictions. Clearly there has been a significant uptake of NEPIs in all five 
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jurisdictions. However, important differences remain between the specific policy instrument 
mixes across different jurisdictions but also within one and the same jurisdiction over time. A 
certain degree of hybridisation of ‘old’ and ‘new’ instruments towards what Gunningham and 
Grabosky (1998) have termed ‘smart regulation’. 
 
Seeking to specify what is an optimal mix a priori is an important and interesting theoretical 
topic, but it does not really explain why instruments are actually mixed in the real world of 
policy and politics.  Taking a longitudinal empirical perspective has allowed us to identify 
leaders, followers and laggards for different types of NEPIs. It has revealed policy instrument 
diffusion patterns that are influenced by jurisdictional path-dependencies that can lead to very 
different sequencing of the adoption of certain types of NEPIs. For example, Germany adopted 
a national eco-label scheme already in 1978 while Austria (1990), the Netherlands (1992) and 
EU (1992) followed the German example only after a considerable time lag. By the late 2010s 
the UK still had not adopted a national eco-label scheme while relying instead on the EU eco-
label at least until it exists from the EU.  
 
In all five jurisdictions, complex policy instrument mixes have emerged which blend the ‘old’ 
and the ‘new’ in puzzlingly different ways. In the language of the (new modes of) governance 
literature what we seem to be witnessing is arguably best described as ‘governance-cum-
government’. However, there is little empirical evidence for the widely held claim that non-
coercive policy instruments (such as informational instruments and voluntary agreements) 
should be used before coercive instruments are adopted. This has created a complex mixture 
of (policy instrument) continuity and change in different jurisdictions which may use 
differently one and the same type of policy instrument.   
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Classic administrative theory largely considered policy instrument selection as ‘a neutral, 
even scientific exercise’ (Bemelmans-Videc, Rist and Vedung 1997: 268). However, Hood 
(1983: 136) has flagged up that:  
Given that all feasible alternatives cannot be systematically approached, it follows 
that in many cases politics will play a large part in the selection of tools for the job… 
Indeed, very commonly it is the instrument selected for reaching a policy aim that is 
far more contentious than the aim itself.  
 
The jurisdictional context variable (e.g. national or sectoral policy styles) play an important 
role for both the selection and specific design of policy instruments.  
 
Once established within a particular jurisdiction, policy instruments tend to retain their 
relative role in the policy instrument mix for a considerable period of time. However, as 
Smith and Ingram (2002: 598) have pointed out: in the real world of politics and power, ‘the 
tool box is not constant. It changes over time as a result of the invention of new tools, 
national and international developments, and the interactions of the supranational 
institutions’. Bridging the theoretical accounts, which are often informed by economic cost-
effectiveness considerations, with more political and institutional approaches of the evolution 
of policy instrument mixes in the real world should help us to understand better why it is 
often difficult to move from ‘not so smart policy instrument mixes’ towards smart policy 
instrument mixes. 
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